SANCTIONS AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: DISTINCTION OF CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURAL NATURE

Abstract

The present article provides a comprehensive scholarly study and a comparative legal analysis of the institutions of special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions) and criminal liability within the legal framework of Ukraine. The paper elucidates the legal nature of sanctions as an instrument of state policy in the field of national security and foreign policy, applied outside the scope of classical criminal proceedings. In contrast, criminal liability is considered as a form of the exercise of state coercion, implemented exclusively as a result of judicial proceedings and based on the principles of the presumption of innocence, adversarial proceedings, and proof of guilt. Particular attention is devoted to the analysis of the procedure for the imposition of sanctions, as well as to the role of the judiciary in ensuring effective oversight of compliance with human rights and the rule of law in the course of their application. The study examines the adequacy of procedural safeguards afforded to persons subject to sanctions, in particular their access to effective remedies. Special emphasis is placed on the transformation of the sanctions mechanism under martial law, in particular the introduction of a procedure for the recovery of assets into state revenue through the High Anti-Corruption Court. The standards of proof in the relevant proceedings are analyzed, as well as their distinction from those inherent in criminal proceedings, which makes it possible to differentiate sanctions from criminal punishment in terms of their procedural nature. The article also considers international experience in the application of sanctions, in particular the practice of the United States of America and the European Union, demonstrating the necessity of a clear distinction between sanctions as an administrative or politico-legal instrument and criminal liability as a form of legal responsibility.