CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL GUARANTEES OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER MARTIAL LAW AND THE DIGITALISATION OF JUSTICE

Abstract

The article examines the constitutional and legal guarantees of the right to a fair trial under the simultaneous impact of two processes: martial law and the digitalisation of justice. The relevance of the topic lies in the fact that digital instruments are no longer merely auxiliary technical tools of court administration. They have become a factor that directly affects access to court, procedural communication, equality of arms, the right of defence, publicity of hearings, and the immediacy of examination of evidence. The purpose of the article is to develop constitutional and legal criteria for assessing digital forms of administering justice under martial law and to determine the limits of their compatibility with the right to a fair trial. The methodological basis of the study combines formal legal, systemic, comparative legal, and functional methods. The article distinguishes three normative levels of analysis: constitutional guarantees that remain non-derogable even under martial law; the broader conventional and statutory standard of the right to a fair trial; and the digital conditions of implementation of these guarantees. It is argued that martial law does not create a separate or reduced standard of a fair trial. It allows only such organisational and digital adaptations that have a proper legal basis, meet the criterion of objective necessity, preserve the functional equivalence of core procedural guarantees, and provide effective mechanisms of review and legal redress in the event of technical failure or violation of procedural rights. The article shows that the main risks of digitalisation are concentrated in digital inequality, technical dependence of access to court, fragmentation of electronic infrastructure, threats to the confidentiality of communication with counsel, weakening of the immediacy of proceedings, and opacity of algorithm-driven tools. The scientific contribution of the article consists in substantiating a three-level model for the constitutional assessment of digital changes in judicial proceedings, covering the normative legitimacy of the digital tool, the equivalence of procedural guarantees in the digital environment, and the controllability of its consequences. The article concludes that the further development of e-justice in Ukraine should be understood as constitutionally controlled modernisation in which digital efficiency remains subordinate to the requirements of a fair trial.